Country Concepts and the Rational Actor Trap: Limitations to Strategic Management of International NGOs by Kohnert, Dirk
www.ssoar.info
Country Concepts and the Rational Actor
Trap: Limitations to Strategic Management of
International NGOs
Kohnert, Dirk
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sonstiges / other
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kohnert, D. (2005). Country Concepts and the Rational Actor Trap: Limitations to Strategic Management of
International NGOs.. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55998-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-SA Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Weitergebe unter gleichen
Bedingungen) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den
CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-SA Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
 - 1 - 
Dirk Kohnert 1 
 
 
Country concepts and the rational actor trap 
Limitations to strategic management of international NGOs 
 
 
 
Abstract:  Growing criticism of inefficient development aid demanded new planning 
instruments of donors, including international NGOs (INGOs). A reorientation from isolated 
project-planning towards holistic country concepts and the increasing rationality of a result-
orientated planning process were seen as answer. However, whether these country concepts – 
newly introduced by major INGOs too - have increased the efficiency of development 
cooperation is open to question. Firstly, there have been counteracting external factors, like 
the globalization of the aid business, that demanded structural changes in the composition of 
INGO portfolios towards growing short-term humanitarian aid; this was hardly compatible 
with the requirements of medium-term country planning. Secondly, the underlying vision of 
rationality as a remedy for the major ills of development aid was in itself a fallacy. A major 
change in the methodology of planning, closely connected with a shift of emphasis in the 
approach to development cooperation, away from project planning and service delivery, 
towards supporting the socio-cultural and political environment of the recipient communities, 
demands a reorientation of aid management: The most urgent change needed is by donors, 
away from the blinkers of result-orientated planning towards participative organizational 
cultures of learning. 
 
Key words:  foreign aid, aid effectiveness, INGOs, planning policy, development management, 
participation, Africa; globalization 
 
JEL classification: F35 - Foreign Aid; L31 - Nonprofit Institutions, NGOs; L33 - Comparison 
of Public and Private Enterprises; O2 – Development Planning and Policy  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 GIGA – German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg. - An earlier 
version of the paper had been presented to the annual conference of the Research Committee for Developing 
Countries / Verein für Socialpolitik, Cologne, July 2 to 3, 2004. The paper draws from my cross-sectoral 
evaluation of the German international NGO German Agro Action (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, DWHH; cf. 
Kohnert 2002). - Thanks for valuable suggestions go to Rolf Hofmeier, Rolf Langhammer, Friedrich 
Mühlenberg, Hans J. Preuss, the participants of the conference mentioned above, and last but not least, the 
staff and board members of DWHH, as well as its counterparts overseas. The responsibility for any fallacies 
or inaccuracies in the paper remains of course with the author. 
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1. Changing conditions demand new NGO-management concepts 
 
The world of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has changed considerably since the 
advent of the second wind of change in the late 1980s, which allowed for more involvement 
of non-state actors in development issues. Local NGOs mushroomed, notably in Africa (cf. 
Charlton/May 1995) 
2
. In many cases they had to fill the gaps created by the deregulation and 
privatisation of their countries economies, enforced by structural adjustment programs in the 
1980s and 1990s. However, the NGO boom was regarded as a mixed blessing in many parts 
of the world. Although hardly anybody doubted that most of them had honourable intentions, 
it was open to question whether they were more efficient than public aid agencies, or whether 
they did any good at all (cf. Doh/Teegen 2003; Edwards/Hulme 1996; Hulme 1997; 
MacDonald 1995; Weiss/Gordenker 1996; Salih 2001; Schmitz 2001). NGOs are different, 
but not necessarily better than market- or state-organizations. Many local NGOs were 
dependent on funds from public and private aid agencies at national or international level, for 
whom they acted as intermediaries or representatives of target-groups. On the other hand, 
their donors were dependent on local counterparts, as they had no direct access to the 
beneficiaries. This situation created uneasy patronage relationships. Since the 1980s an 
increasing number of national NGOs of major donor countries have transformed themselves 
from activist partisan movements into international NGOs (INGOs) with the same corporate 
structures  as other international key players. They began to wield considerable political 
power in international relations, like Oxfam, Human Rights Watch or Greenpeace. Their 
voice carries weight, not only in relations with their partners, but also with governments, big 
international aid institutions and multinational enterprises.  
 
Whereas, still in the early 1990s, NGOs, including the big INGOs, had been portrayed as 
dependent rather than independent variables in Third World Development, as aid agencies 
defined by the demands of isolated project-related activities (cf. Charlton/May 1995:238), 
some of the most prolific INGOs profiled themselves in the meantime as global players, as a 
model of ‘good governance without government’ in the public interest (cf. Nelson/Dorsey 
2003). Notably international advocacy networks of NGOs were regarded as intermediary 
                                                 
2
 Depending on one's definition, the number of INGOs today ranges from 5,000 to 40,000. The Yearbook of 
International Organizations listed entries on 29,495 organizations active in 289 countries and territories in 
2000. It profiled 24,326 international non-governmental and about 5,900 inter-governmental organizations 
(IGOs). Cf. website: www.uia.org/organizations/home.php, 29.04.04; the number of additional local or 
national NGOs in Africa was estimated at several 10,000, which compared favorably with the more than 
10,000 in Latin America. – INGOs spend up to $ 10 Mrd. annually and even displaced governments as the 
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between world markets and ODA-hierarchies, as a potential ‘third way’ or a counter-
hegemonic force, linking marginalized groups in the South to political actors in the North. 
Undoubtedly, a great deal of control of this agenda setting rests with more powerful INGOs 
who wish to generate knowledge which serves also their own interest (cf. Henry et al 
2004:842, 848-49; Evans 2000) 
3
. Political pluralism and administrative pluralism, 
implemented through a governance role for INGOs, could under certain conditions be 
complementary, rather than competitive or antagonistic. They could strengthen state 
performance and legitimacy, notably of ‘failing states’ in Sub-Saharan Africa. In any case, 
this is an overtly political process which has also be misused to foster Western values and 
methods poorly adapted to local socio-cultural conditions (cf. Henry et al 2004: 847).  
Certainly, even weak states, which may have lost its former powers as monopolistic 
gatekeepers of aid intervention on the local level, remain important mediators of transnational 
social networks and INGOs (cf. Kassimir 2001:109-11). But the insistence on maintaining the 
state as the principal actor in development cooperation in general, and in international peace 
efforts in particular, is open to question. State actors are neither the only nor necessarily the 
most important actors. Non-state actors are also playing central roles in international 
responses to conflicts attracting international attention — from the crucial role of civilians in 
the UN mission in Cambodia to the front-line humanitarian role of NGOs in Somalia, Sudan, 
Rwanda, Zaire, El Salvador, and other conflict prone regions around the world. NGOs are 
located at the interface between societal and state actors and therefore occupy a strategically 
important position in conflict situations (cf. Bush 1997).  
 
The focusing on new rules, organizations, and structures by the international donor 
community corresponded to academic analyses, notably in political science, of the ‘failing 
state’ in Africa and elsewhere 4, and on the crucial role of governmental and non-
governmental organizations in promoting institutional, technical, administrative and political 
                                                                                                                                                        
primary recipients of some categories of Official Development Assistance (ODA), notably humanitarian or 
emergency assistance (cf. Charlton/May 1995; Smillie 1993:14. 
3
 Examples are the famous advocacy campaigns of Oxfam against ‘Rigged rules and double standards – trade, 
globalization, and the fight against poverty’ (2002), and ‘White Gold’ Turns to Dust - Which Way Forward 
for Cotton in West Africa?’ (2004), the campaigns of the London based NGO Jubilee 2000 for debt 
cancellation for LDCs, of Human Rights Watch and others against ‘blood diamonds’, that of Greenpeace 
against Shell and Brant Spar, or its opposition to the exploitation of the Ogonis in the Niger Delta, etc.  
4. Whereas one might accept the notion of ‘failed states’ as an ethic value judgment on certain post-colonial 
states like Afghanistan, Congo, Liberia or Somalia, the scientific concept of ‘failed states’, notably as applied 
to Africa, is questionable for several reasons. Prominent among these are a lack of historical considerations, 
biased western notions on the scope of a state, and a ‘cold-war’ bias in international political science (cf. 
Bilgin/Morton 2002; Clapham 2000; Kale 2001). There is little empirical evidence of the uniqueness of a sui 
generis (failing) African state (cf. Goldsmith 2000). Last, but not least, the concept of ‘failing states’ is 
misleading insofar as its proponents are often concerned with rather strong and violent state structures, 
which, unfortunately, have too many failures. 
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capacity, each embodying distinct challenges for responsible governments and aid institutions 
(cf. Grindle 1996:8-9, 180-84; Reno 1998; Scott 1998; Wunsch/Olowu 1990; Zartmann 
1995). In view of the limited resources and capacities of ‘failing states’, ODA-agencies 
increasingly recognized the need to cooperate more closely with NGOs and other non-state 
actors in the late 1990s 
5
. In some cases, INGOs like the German Agro Action (DWHH), were 
even the only institutions, along with UN organizations, that could still provide relief in 
‘failing states’, when the latter rejected interventions by foreign state agencies because of 
their alleged partisan or imperialist interests, like North-Korea. All this had a serious impact 
on the planning and management methods of the NGOs concerned on both sides, i.e. the 
donors (INGOs) and the intermediary NGOs, who were meant to cooperate in close 
partnership with one another. 
 
Since the 1980s, a growing public criticism of inefficient development aid in general, and 
of failing or unsustainable development projects in particular, has resulted in political pressure 
to establish and confirm the legitimacy of aid, and in a consequent reorientation from isolated 
project-planning towards more rational and coordinated management of aid programs (cf. 
chapter 2). All the changes mentioned above have had strategic implications for INGOs. In 
view of the multitude of different aims and concepts of aid, Western donors called for a 
harmonization of aid strategies, including INGOs 
6
. Non-state actors were assigned a special 
role as partners in development planning. The case of the ACP Cotonou accord was a notable 
example in this respect (cf. DAC 2003; Morau 2003; Traub-Merz/Schildberg 2003). Among 
other benefits, it was envisaged that better planning and closer cooperation would produce 
synergy effects increase  the market power exerted by donors, and enhance their influence on 
politics, human rights and structural adjustment in the recipient countries. Major INGOs were 
urged to adopt similar planning procedures as ODA-institutions, mainly for the following 
reasons:  
 
                                                 
5
 Cf. DAC 2003; Karlshausen 2003; Morau 2003; Traub-Merz/Schildberg 2003; Kassimir 2001. 
6
 As example, see the slogan of the German Ministry for Cooperation (BMZ) ‘EZ aus einem Guss’, i.e. 
‘development aid as a unified whole’; cf. Kenneweg 2000:238. – The EU adopted a standard framework for 
the elaboration of country strategy papers in May 1999, cf. Kloster 2000. - In February 2003 major donors 
adopted ‘DAC guidelines for harmonizing donor practices for effective aid delivery’ (OECD 2003), 
explicitly including NGOs, and promoting common country- and sector analyses (cf. Oswald et al 2004). - 
For similar concepts and calls for cooperation with NGOs cf. the Worldbank (WB 2003) and its country 
concepts, i.e. its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), introduced in 1999, as well as the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which were considered as an action plan for the CDF, meant to provide 
governments with the incentives to adopt CDF principles in their development planning and cooperation with 
donors (cf. WB 2003:12-13).  
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- Firstly, to respond to the demands of co-funding state agencies for harmonization 
of planning procedures (cf. chapter 2).  
- Secondly, to be able to survive in the increasingly competitive international 
market. Respectable INGOs continued to put their mission and ideals in promoting 
welfare, human rights, or development first. Nevertheless, they had to pay growing 
attention to corporate objectives, such as increasing revenues and conquering 
strategic market positions to ensure their survival in the highly contested global aid 
and emergency relief market. Like any other big enterprise, they had to handle 
their production- and service delivery processes  in accordance with internationally 
recognized standards and methods of corporate governance 
7
. 
- Thirdly, in reaction to mounting pressure on NGOs to establish their legitimacy in 
view of growing criticism of inefficient development aid in general, and of failing 
or unsustainable NGO-projects in particular, they had to honour obligations vis à 
vis their sponsors and the general public for enhanced sustainability, transparency 
and accountability. 
 
These demands also impacted on local NGOs management policies, which mirrored  the 
new requirements confronting their donors and partners. Despite the rhetoric of participation 
and ownership, asymmetrical power relationships determined the demand for control- and 
result-orientated management methods on the part of local NGOs (cf. Henry et al 2004: 849-
52). National and international NGO networks introduced codes of conduct to allow for closer 
cooperation, more effective control, and a continuing flow of resources 
8
.  
 
Nevertheless, the new dynamics of aid revealed a widening credibility gap between the 
promises and language of aid and development and the facts of increasing poverty, inequality 
and gross human rights violations, notably in those countries most affected by aid programs. 
In what follows, I should like to suggest some answers to the question, whether the new 
management methods, introduced to overcome the shortcomings of the aid business of non-
state actors, are likely to deliver the promised results. The introduction of country strategy 
papers as strategic management instruments by INGOs may serve as an example to illustrate 
the points in question. The concentration on INGOs seems to be justified out of various 
                                                 
7
 On the aid-business and INGOs as political entrepreneurs cf. Kohnert 2002; Tvedt 1998; Waal 1997. 
8
 Cf. Lancaster (2000). For different international and national Code of Conducts for NGOs cf. website: 
http://habitat.igc.org/treaties/at-10.htm; 29.04.04; Code of Conduct for NGOs in Ethiopia cf. website: 
www.gdrc.org/ngo/codesofconduct/africa-code.html, 29.04.04; Code of Conduct for NGOs in Botswana cf. 
website: www.bocongo.bw/code.pdf, 29.04.04; etc. 
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reasons, but notably because of their strategically important position in humanitarian aid and 
conflict resolution mentioned above, and secondly, because they are often said to be the most 
likely of all aid agencies of the international donor community to honour the pious promises 
of aid efficiency, empowerment, partnership and transparency (cf. Nelson/Dorsey 2003).  
 
 
2. Rational, target-orientated concepts as panacea of the planning process? 
 
Criticism of inefficient development aid in general, and of failing or unsustainable 
development projects in particular, resulted in a reorientation from isolated project-planning 
towards more rational and coordinated program-planning in the 1980s. Increasing rationality 
of the planning process was seen by aid agencies like the gtz or the Worldbank as panacea to 
prevent inefficient aid. Logical framework and target- or result-orientated planning (ZOPP 
and later on PCM) were introduced in the 1980s as major tools of planning, implementation 
and evaluation, to counteract inefficiency and a lack of transparency and accountability in 
development aid (cf. Kohnert/Preuß/Sauer 1992; Roberts 2002). In addition, globalisation of 
the aid business and the second wind of change allowed for the increasing, though 
controversial linkage of a more rational and coordinated planning process of ODA and 
political and economic conditionality by bilateral and multilateral donors since the late 1980s 
(cf. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), Comprehensive Development Frameworks 
(CDFs), Cotonou Accord, etc.) 
9
. Country strategy papers, supplemented by sector wide 
strategy concepts became a milestone in this rationalistic vision of a systematic chain of 
problem analyses and program proposals from the macro (national) level, via sector programs 
and projects, to aid-projects at meso- and micro level. Thus country concepts were introduced 
as major strategic management instruments of development agencies in the 1990s 
10
. 
 
However, evaluations of country- and sector strategic planning concepts revealed major 
deficiencies for a variety of reasons. Target-orientated and results-based approaches are 
theoretically contested and hard to implement (cf. Berg 2000; Biggs/Smith 2003; Chapman 
                                                 
9
 There is an ongoing controversy on the impact of conditionality on aid, notably in sub-Saharan Africa, which is 
however beyond the scope of this paper; cf. Easterly 2002; Kanbur 2000; Killick 1997; Mosley 1996; Pender 
2001; Svensson 2003. 
10
 For an overview on the state of the art in country strategy papers as instrument of strategic development 
planning cf. ids 2001; Kenneweg 2000; Kloster 2000; WB 2003. - For examples of INGO Country Strategy 
papers see the country concepts of German Agro Action (DWHH-Länderkonzepte; Preuss 2000), and the 
results of its cross-sectoral evaluation (Kohnert 2002; Kohnert/Preuss 2003), as well as the country concepts 
of the British ActionAid (2000) which may be regarded as a kind of model for INGOs (cf. Kohnert 
2002:Appendix D & E). 
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2002; Easterly 2002; ids 2001; Kohnert/Preuss/Sauer 1992; Maxwell 2003:12-20; Roper et al 
2003; WB 2003:10). Aid in Africa, for example, is abound of examples where conditionality 
was violated by donors and recipients alike. Both are so enmeshed at all levels of governance, 
agencies and individuals, that it is difficult to say, where the strength and weakness lie. 
Conditionality and aid dependency are in most cases no one-way road; there is strength in the 
weakness of the recipients, as well as weakness in the strength of the donors. Therefore, the 
standard critiques of the unequal power relationship between donors and recipients in Africa 
and elsewhere, captures only part of the truth (cf. Kanbur 2000: 5-8) 
11
. Although this does 
not make the instrument of country concepts useless, it imposes severe restrictions on the 
scope of its application, and not only in the case of INGOs, notably for the following reasons. 
 
Firstly, there are a multitude of competing planning and management tools among and 
even within aid agencies. Holistic concepts of country planning should have priority over 
sector concepts, but as strategic policy papers they are not operational and have to be 
supplemented by sector papers. Although these instruments were meant to fit into a coherent, 
hierarchically structured framework, at least within one and the same organization, they are 
often incoherent and mutually competitive (or even contradictory ), rather than 
complementary. 
In fact, even the underlying assumption that country programs can be evolved stringently 
and consistently from an analysis of the development potential and problems of national 
stakeholders, is highly questionable, both on theoretical and practical grounds. This applies 
especially to INGOs who, like their counterparts, are as a rule neither capable nor willing to 
combat poverty or marginalisation at a national level. A holistic nationwide country concept 
may, at the most, be workable in small priority countries, where big INGOs already exert a 
certain structural power in development issues  on the grounds of proven competence (as in 
the case of DWHH emergency aid in Rwanda or Burundi). But even in such exceptional 
cases, country planning is likely to be restricted to the provincial level. Nevertheless, the 
claim of country concepts to define or develop priority areas of intervention  from a 
background analysis of the political, social and economic setting, or from a holistic crisis 
analysis of the whole country, is justified and should be encouraged and further developed in 
close cooperation with the relevant partners. If, in view of these conditions, a target-orientated 
deduction of programs and projects from the country concept is not to be expected, the 
                                                 
11
 There are illustrative analyses based on the principal-agent concept, which show that the present aid-system as 
a whole is ineffective and inefficient (cf. Kapor 2000:6-8; Killick 1997; Pedersen 1997), but it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to go into it in detail. 
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question arises, whether there are other objective criteria for the selection of partners, priority 
sectors, regions and project proposals within a country. The lack of such criteria has been 
identified by DWHH desk-officers as one of the major drawbacks of its project planning. The 
call for superior management decisions or more rigid selection guidelines is understandable 
but counter productive in view of the existing workload relating to project implementation 
and monitoring (cf. IDS 2001:1). In the case of DWHH, an implicit restriction of choice has 
already been effected by its management’ s decision to concentrate on humanitarian and 
emergency aid (cf. below). In any case, there is no substitute for closer cooperation with 
stakeholders and more participative project planning (cf. below). 
 
What needs to be considered in the case of INGOs, apart from their limited resources, are 
their strong historical, ideological or religious links to certain counterparts in their respective 
countries. An impersonal, target-orientated derivation of aid programs from the actual local 
social setting has at times been resented under such conditions as undue restriction of ones 
own ideological or religious convictions. This resentment has been reinforced by a hubris, 
common among many development experts, who are convinced that they best know the 
stakeholders’ real problems , and who subsequently fall for inappropriate technical solutions 
to social problems (cf. Kohnert 1995). Last but not least, even dedicated collaborators of 
NGOs value a close collaboration with trustworthy and reliable counterparts more than 
obedience to abstract administrative rules concerning target-orientated project planning. 
Country portfolios therefore, tend to reflect  special relationships between INGO desk officers 
and their counterparts (cf. Preuss, 2000:246). The principal-agent approach of institutional 
economics (cf. Laffont 2002; Killick 1997; Pedersen 1997) can provide illustrative examples 
and insights on several levels of analysis of the problems in question. However, we should 
always bear in mind that its methodological approach of individual decision making is based 
on rational choice, and that the rationality of Western economists does not necessarily 
correspond to the rationality of the stakeholders in Africa and elsewhere (cf. below). In 
addition, individual agency based on rational choice may be limited by social rationalities 
which obey different rules, like in the case of altruistic reciprocity (cf. Diekmann 2004). 
 
The ever-increasing flood of planning guidelines makes the whole planning process not 
only excessively bureaucratic, but also heavily biased towards hierarchical control. This bias 
endangers the major goal of any development planning, i.e. the promotion of the mutual 
understanding of all stakeholders concerned. This applies to both the ODA-agencies and 
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INGOs, like the DWHH or the British ActionAid 
12
. The quest for rational planning reaches 
its limits in the human factor, i.e. the partisan interests of implementing units or personnel and 
their counterparts, regardless whether this is an NGO, like the DWHH (cf. Kohnert 2002: 12-
14, 29-31; Kohnert/Preuss 2003), or a governmental aid organization. Even the Worldbank 
complained in a recent evaluation of its Comprehensive Development Framework (country 
planning) papers: ‘…most donor agencies and recipient governments do not have internal 
structures that encourage cross-sectoral dialogue or easy integration of multi-sector 
interventions. In addition, ‘silo’ thinking and intersectoral / departmental competition in 
donor agencies can exacerbate inter-ministerial competition in client countries.’ (WB, 2003: 
xix) 
13
. Preliminary results of an internal evaluation of Priority Strategy Papers (PSP)-papers 
of the German Ministry for Development Cooperation (BMZ), as well as recent evaluation 
reports on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) of the World Bank and IMF (cf. 
WB 2004; IMF 2004) point in the same direction 
14
. Apart from an insufficient systematic 
linkage to sector-orientated planning instruments, like Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs), 
PSP, PRSPs or Social Development Sector Strategy Paper (SSP), country strategy papers 
have been criticized for their insufficient general orientation, unrealistic assumptions, 
avoidance of sensitive issues or deficits (e.g. in governance on both sides), and biased 
problem analyses, sometimes dominated by the partisan interests of implementing aid 
agencies (like the WB, gtz or KfW) (cf. GTZ 2001). The present tendency for harmonization 
of aid programs, and the related program-orientated basket financing by several donors, 
complicate the matter even further. They make isolated country concepts by individual donors 
increasingly superfluous in so far as the country portfolio of a specific donor agency is 
dominated by co-financed programs and the weight of an external dominant donor.  
 
                                                 
12
 The evaluation unit of the DWHH edited more than 40 guidelines since 1984, about a quarter of which could 
be regarded as sector concepts; not all of them were compatible with the DWHH country strategy papers; cf. 
Kohnert 2002: 24, annex 2. - cf. similar ActionAid: ‘A growing concern voiced by staff and local partners in 
recent years has been the disproportionate amount of time and effort that is going into meeting ActionAid' s 
planning and reporting requirements. If it were only a question of wrong priorities, the problem could be 
easily rectified by reordering time allocation. The bigger risk is the spread of a culture of bureaucratization 
and disempowerment of staff, partners and ultimately the poor people that we work with. ALPS aims to 
liberate staff and partners from the tyranny of filling endless forms and writing lengthy, beautifully presented 
plans and reports that mostly adorn some shelf or archive … by fostering a culture where staff and partners 
do not have the comfort of relying on rules and procedures but have to use their own initiative to achieve our 
common mission.’ (ActionAid 2000: Introduction, n. p.) 
13
 On the appraisal of the Worldbank driven SSP on the impact of social dimensions within important Bank 
macro processes such as the CAS and PRSPs cf. already-completed and ongoing self- and independent 
evaluations; available on the website: www.worldbank.org/oed/sdstudy, 26.04.04 
14
 According to the declared aims, BMZ country strategy papers, for example, are complemented, by Priority 
Strategy Papers (PSP)
 as ‘fine-tuned management and steering instruments that enable it to monitor country-
specific implementation of its development-policy goals’ (GTZ-Glossary, www.gtz.de/glossar/englisch/…; 
21.04.04), as well as by PRSP programs, and cross-sectoral strategies. In principle, these latter apply to all 
development programs, as does, for instance, the paper on participatory development cooperation. 
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 A second major conceptual limitation of country concepts reveals itself in cases of 
planning under extremely uncertain conditions, like in cases of humanitarian or emergency 
aid and crisis resolution (cf. Klingebiel 1999). These cases are per definition beyond the scope 
of middle-term target-orientated country planning, because, as a rule, emergencies and crises 
are not predictable. To cope with such problems of planning, aid agencies have used mixed 
strategies, including reactive as well as preventive elements. Both strategies, however, are 
process-orientated rather than the result of explicit strategic planning (cf. Klingebiel 1999). 
Only in countries with a predictable conflict potential, specific measures of conflict 
prevention can be embedded into a country concept 
15
.  
 
For these reasons, a greater reliance on country portfolios, granted on the base of more 
general global criteria of political conditionality of aid (cf. above), as a substitute for country 
concepts has been suggested and discussed, albeit controversially 
16
. As a matter of fact, most 
big aid agencies already have informal (but nevertheless binding) country- or at least regional 
quotas as guidelines for the distribution of their aid money. This also holds for the INGOs; the 
DWHH for example reserved the bulk of its own aid money in 2001 for sub-Saharan Africa 
(40 per cent) and one-third each for Asia and Latin America 
17
.  
 
 These problems of ‘planning without facts’ (Stolper 1966) have been amplified in the case 
of INGOs by the growing tendency to concentrate aid, in view of their limited own resources 
on emergencies and crisis resolution (cf. Rutherford/Brem/Matthew 2003; Smillie 1993). 
INGOs are especially liable to opt for humanitarian or emergency aid because of their 
comparative advantages over official aid agencies, e. g. greater flexibility and lesser exposure 
to diplomatic restrictions, but also because this provides a profitable niche for growing 
business. Hence, the profit of the so-called Non-Profit Organizations will not be reaped only 
in heaven; analogies with the moral history of agricultural productive cooperative societies in 
                                                 
15
 The DWHH, for example, elaborated country concepts for an initial 20 out of 30 priority countries between 
1999 and 2001. For ten priority countries there are at present no country concepts, because political 
conditions are judged to be too unstable to allow even for short-term planning and forecasts. Whether this is a 
convincing argument is open to question; it can be argued that at least framework planning, specifically 
designed to address imponderables and to identify a variety of contingent planning options, should  be 
possible (cf. Kohnert/Preuss 2003: 381). 
16
 There is related controversial proposal to gradually substituting program aid by budget aid in the case of 
recipient countries with proven capacity in ‘good government’, or in the case of corresponding recipients in 
the sphere of non-state actors, by the partnership funds. This is, for instance, already being practiced by 
Misereor. However, this whole complex falls beyond the scope of this paper.  
17
 In 2001 the own resources (donations) of the DWHH were distributed as follows: Country group (LG) 1 Latin 
America: 18 per cent; LG 2, Central America and Caribbean: 12 per cent; LG 3, South-East Asia: 10 per 
cent; LG 4, south-East Asia: 14 per cent; LG 5, Central Asia: 6 per cent; LG 6, West Africa: 7 per cent; LG 
7, East Africa and Great Lake Region: 11 per cent; LG East Africa and Horn of Africa: 10 per cent; LG9, 
Southern Africa: 12 per cent. (cf. Kohnert 2002:29). 
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Europe might not be far fetched. Thus the DWHH in 1998 made a deliberate corporate 
decision to extend its rehabilitation and emergency programs which constituted already two 
thirds of its overall aid budget only two years later 
18
.  
 
The high degree of external co-funding by ODA-agencies makes of these programs  
especially attractive from a management point of view, because they may provide for 
exceptional growth rates in aid budgets. At the same time, this could make participating 
NGOs especially vulnerable to external political pressures. To the degree that NGOs 
increasingly cooperate with state agencies, it becomes open to question whether they may still 
be considered as advocates of the poor, as the British secretary of state for development 
cooperation, Claire Short, warned as long as three years ago in relation to OXFAM 
19
. The 
delicate new strategic alliances between selected multinationals and INGOs, like Nike and 
Global Allicance, Carrefour and FIDH, Lafarge and WWF, complicate the matter even more 
20
. Although the underlying corporate decisions were as a rule perfectly compatible with the 
mandate of these NGOs, emergency aid came increasingly under fire from aid critics, who 
said that it may have caused more harm than good in the medium to long run in countries like 
Rwanda, Sudan or Somalia (cf. Anderson 1999; Neubert 2004; 1997; Elwert 1999, Albala-
Bertrand 2000) as long ago as 1994, big INGOs agreed therefore upon a Code of Conduct for 
emergency programs, concentrating on sustainability and adaptation of activities to local 
conditions. Nevertheless, aid organizations, like OXFAM and Médecins sans Frontières have 
for years openly admitted that their emergency operations may have strengthened the 
warlords and aggravated the conflicts under certain conditions (cf. Allen 1999:199). However, 
they maintain that there is no ethically responsible alternative to humanitarian aid. 
 
                                                 
18
 The volume of DWHH emergency aid increased in just two years from DM 68,3 Mio. (1998) to DM 93 Mio. 
(2000) and constituted 62,4 per cent of overall aid (cf. Preuss 2000). 88 per cent of emergency aid had been 
co-financed – overwhelmingly by ODA-institutions – thus indicating a notably high degree of dependence on 
external finance, although the DWHH applied a kind of self-restriction, by introducing a structural limitation 
of emergency aid in an administrative provision, stipulating that at least 20 per cent of total emergency aid 
had to be met by its own resources (cf. Kohnert 2002:19). 
19
 Cf. Alain Beattie, ‘Campaigners offer moral integrity for influence’, Financial Times, 17.07.01. – The 
principal-agent approach of institutional economics (cf. Laffont 2002; Killick 1997) provides illustrative 
examples and insights on several levels of analysis of the problems in question, e.g. on the difficult process 
of interaction in cases of asymmetric information between donors and governments of recipient countries 
with vested interest to sideline political conditioning of aid concerning poverty alleviation (cf. Pedersen 
1997), or between local NGOs or governments as agents and their principal (e.g. donors, including INGOs). 
But the case of INGOs as agents of their principals, i.e. sponsors or members, where the former have hidden 
information and/or pursue a hidden agenda vis à vis the latter, could be of equal importance. It might result in 
growing alienation between both, as well as in an increasing diversion from their common original aims. This 
might be accompanied and accelerated by a gradual substitution (sponsors vs. state) of the principal of those 
INGOs involved in the delicate relationship of co-financing humanitarian aid. Again, this is beyond of the 
scope of the study. 
20
 cf. ‘ONG et multinationales tentent de s'approvisionner’, Le Monde, 18./19.01.2004, p. 17 
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The consequences of this vicious circle for strategic country planning are still open to 
question. However, an undeniable tendency has been observed for INGOs to ‘streamline’ 
their country evaluation and problem analysis in crisis-prone countries like Angola or Rwanda 
in order to forestall undue criticism from their counterparts, competing aid agencies, or the 
general public (cf. Kohnert 2002:20). A simple answer to this problem would be to split 
country concepts for public consumption (e.g. for fund raising and window-dressing 
purposes) from more explicit but confidential internal planning documents. However, this can 
hardly be considered as a sustainable solution, as it would counteract the overriding principle 
of participative development, and contradict the overall aim of all development planning, 
namely to encourage the mutual understanding between all stakeholders.  For this reason, 
such a separation was rejected by (among others) the DWHH. The present trend of 
decentralization in major aid institutions (like gtz or DWHH), not only in the field of project 
implementation, but also in program planning, could be a first step in the right direction, 
provided that decentralized planning and implementation are based on participatory planning 
methods (cf. Kohnert 2002: 21-3; cf. chapter 3 below). 
 
 
In summary, the quest for rational, target-orientated planning in general, and for viable 
country concepts as strategic management instruments of NGOs in particular, has had 
ambiguous effects. A major aim behind the exercise, i.e. the due consideration of the political, 
socio-cultural and socio-economic setting of a country in delimitating aid programs, is 
justified and constitutes an advance over the low methodological standards of isolated project-
planning of past decades; it should therefore be further developed in a process-orientated 
manner. Those INGOs who introduced country concepts as central planning tools in the 
1990s, generally intensified the dialogue with their partners on priorities of future aid projects 
as well as on planning, monitoring and evaluation procedures; this is commendable and 
should also be continued. However, quite a number of counterparts and staff members 
resented the new result-orientated planning concepts as an imposed additional work load, or 
as a means of control in an unequal partnership, without any tangible benefits (cf. 
Kohnert/Preuss, 2003:381-2). Despite all the rhetoric about partnership on both sides, the 
principal group of stakeholders, the poor and marginalized, have so far been scarcely involved 
in the planning process, at best indirectly through partner organizations, but mostly only as 
objects of planning processes. This still constitutes a major bottleneck of country planning (cf. 
chapter 3). 
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Whether the country concepts have increased the overall rationality of INGO planning 
processes and their implementation is open to question. Firstly, there have been counteracting 
external factors, like the globalisation of the aid business, that demanded structural changes in 
the composition of INGO portfolios towards growing short-term humanitarian aid; this was 
hardly compatible with the requirements of medium-term country planning. Secondly, the 
underlying vision of rationality as a remedy for the major ills of development aid was in itself 
a fallacy. Some three centuries ago, Francisco Goya  chastised a similar form of hubris in his 
famous Capricho ‘The dream [sleep] of reason produces monsters’ 21. On the one hand the 
Cartesian ideal of rationalism is valid: if reason sleeps (is not vigilant), monsters like 
corruption, misappropriation of funds, politically instrumentalised xenophobia (witch-hunts 
against foreigners, like in the Côte d’Ivoire under the pretext of Ivorité), and other violent 
conflicts caused by inappropriate aid may arise. On the other hand, the dream of social, 
economic and political structures, based on the hubris of rational behaviour, may result in 
‘white elephants’, growing inequality and ensuing social and political conflicts. One only 
needs to point to the evils caused by the terrible excesses of ill-advised structural adjustment 
programs of multinational donors up to the early 1990s, e.g. in the case of Rwanda (cf. 
Barré/Shearer/Uvin 1999; Storey 1999:15; Uvin 1998), and to the double talk of propagated 
unlimited rule of free markets over developing economies without due regard to major 
industrialized countries (cf. OXFAM 2002). The dangers incorporated in the hubris of 
rationalism in development planning go far beyond the age-old controversy about the validity 
of the concept of the homo oeconomicus or of culture-specific rationalities. The ongoing 
debate on brain research shows that rational behaviour is influenced by deep-seated emotions 
at least as much as by empirical knowledge and rational reasoning. In fact, human beings 
cannot act rationally without moving emotions 
22
. But even more importantly in this context, 
                                                 
21
 Francisco Goya; Capricho 43, 1797-98: ‘El sueño de la razón produce monstruos’, in English, ‘The dream 
[sleep] of reason produces monsters”, which derives its ambiguity from two antagonistic interpretations, 
arising from the fact that the Spanish word sueño means ‘sleep’ as well as ‘dream. For the image cf. website: 
www.museum.cornell.edu/HFJ/handbook/hb128.html, 01.06.04. – For the risks involved in results-based 
management, demonstrated by the example of the new poverty agenda of multinational donors, cf. Maxwell 
2003:12-20. 
22
 In contrast to the Descartian postulate on the fundamental separation of body and soul (cogito, ergo sum), 
human decision making, by its very biological structure, is never determined by rational reasoning alone, but 
guided by emotions grown on, and deeply embedded, in the respective culture of the actor (Damasio, 
1994:325-28). One may go even one step further in discussing the relevance of Gerald Edelman’s (1992:232-
36) hypothesis that the biological self, at least vital parts of the human brain, have been conditioned and 
structured in the course of human genesis by basic values needed for survival; thus, the evolution of mankind 
provided for the acceptance of basic human value-systems guiding its actions; possibly Edelman´s thesis 
even sheds new light on the controversy concerning the existence of universal human rights. According to 
recent neuro-physiological theories on cognition, the perception of the world in the human brain is being 
directed through the filter of positive and negative sentiments from birth. There is a close neuro-biological 
link between feeling and thinking, which makes the existence of emotions (based on the respective socio-
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the neuro-biological linkage of ratio and emotions, born out of and developed within specific 
socio-cultural settings, is of immediate relevance for the resolution of pressing social needs 
and conflicts typically addressed by development cooperation (cf. Damasio, 1994:326-29, 
344-52). And finally, if particular manners of reduction of complexity, based on culture-
specific emotional structures, and not different rationalities are a major distinction between 
African and Western rational reasoning (cf. Kohnert 2004), then generations of social 
anthropologists since Evans-Pritchard are right in stressing (apparently without much effect) 
that Western-educated development experts and politicians should be particularly careful not 
to cultivate the hubris of rationality in their dialogue with stakeholders deeply rooted in 
foreign cultures.  
 
 
3. Participation, Empowerment, Ownership – A rational, target-orientated 
continuum? 
 
The major change in the planning methods and instruments of aid agencies in the 1990s was 
closely connected with a shift  of emphasis in the approach of development cooperation, away 
from project planning and service delivery towards supporting the socio-cultural and political 
environment of the recipient communities.  
 
Culture is not inherently good or bad, but under certain conditions its propensity to change 
and to influence perceptions of power and values can induce important improvements in well-
being 
23
. Even seemingly static cultural factors such as custom, tradition or ethnicity, often 
said to be barriers to economic growth in Africa, have been adapted to the changing 
requirements of societies. Regarding the impact of culture on development, little attention has 
been paid to the informal sector, though it is still predominant in the social, economic and 
political setting of most African countries. In view of the failure of past development efforts, 
there is a tendency in development policy and research to favour external stimuli to bring 
about cultural innovations. Promoting the competition between cultures and ideas is certainly 
better than the temptation to ban any foreign influence, although, notably in the African 
context, we have to tackle the serious problem of asymmetric power relations in a globalised 
                                                                                                                                                        
cultural setting) a precondition for any rational action. This applies to all human beings, and hence to  
Africans and Europeans alike. 
23
 On the cultural turn in developing economics and its effect on development planning cf. Douglas 2002; OECD 
2002; Rao/Walton 2003; Schönhuth, 2002; Sen 2002; Throsby 2001. 
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world (cf. Sen 2002: 18-19). However, the aid syndrome, or, as James Scott (1998) called it, 
the hubris of the ‘high modernist’ ideology of technocrats, politicians and researchers alike, 
does incorporate the well-known inherent dangers of ethnocentricity and top-down 
approaches; this holds especially for the import of foreign cultural innovations. In addition, it 
diverts attention from exploring and promoting indigenous innovations, and, even worse, it 
may undermine their very base, the informal structure from which they are being generated. 
In this respect we should always bear in mind that culture, even within one distinct entity, is 
neither static, nor a homogeneous block but characterized by an amazing range of different 
historical traits. Deviant voices, if not suppressed by dominant ideologies or powers, more 
often than not come from the inside rather than the outside (cf. Sen 2002:8). It is more likely 
that sustainable development will be initiated when new policies are drafted on the base of 
‘common sense’, the practical knowledge and aspirations of the person-on-the-spot (cf. Scott 
1998:309-41). This, however, is often ignored or considered to be exotic, irrelevant or 
irrational by policy makers and by the proponents of formal ahistoric epistemological 
knowledge (cf. Rao/Walton 2002:5; Scott 1998). The cultural heritage of African countries, 
for example, frequently labelled ‘traditional culture’ or ‘traditional institutions’, is habitually 
regarded in a simplistic and deterministic manner as a customary barrier to economic growth, 
and hence summarily dismissed as ‘informal constraints’ (North 1990:37) 24. This dualistic 
concept of culture (modern vs. traditional) ignores the reality of a universe of different co-
existing, and frequently competing cultures within a society, as well as the development 
potential of indigenous cultural innovations. Not only is this view based on analytic 
oversimplification it is also ethically and politically irresponsible (cf. Sen 2002:2, 9-11; 
Douglas 2002; Hountondji 2001; Odhiambo 2002:2-3).  
 
The basic insight, that there is no sustainable development without the stakeholders 
themselves being concerned about it, led to the proposition of new forms of cooperation to 
empower the target groups to care for themselves. Their greater participation in development 
programs of the donors, capacity building to empower stakeholders to articulate their 
concerns and to increase their policy influence, was meant to lead finally to their ownership of 
the development process. NGOs were proud to be seen at the forefront of this participative 
approach, being closely linked to their partners by common visions and ideals. However, 
towards the close of the 1990s, after a decade of rather disappointing experiences with the 
                                                 
24
 For examples of doubtful oversimplifications of the role of African culture as an impediment to modern 
economic development cf. Harrison/Huntington (2000:xiii) on Ghana (and its harsh critique by Sen 2002:10-
11); North (1990: 36-7).  
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new language of aid, it was realized that there was still a considerable gap between words and 
actions, good intentions and disappointing results, even among those INGOs, that counted 
among the harshest critics of these double standards (cf. ids 2001; Kohnert 2002). 
 
In order to provide for effective and lasting participation of the stakeholders in 
development programs, donors had to overcome the isolated project approach. The wealth of 
experience with different participatory methods in the context of target-orientated project 
planning and implementation proved that these methods were hardly effective and difficult to 
implement because of operational problems and problems of legitimacy 
25
. Participation may 
succeed for specific kinds of programs in favourable circumstances, but it may fail for others, 
were local conditions make co-operative and collective action difficult or were local partners 
manipulate it because of counteracting vested interests (cf. Brett 2003). What would be 
required beyond the participation of target-groups in specific development projects, was a 
stronger regard for the socio-cultural and political dimension of participation. Empowerment, 
i.e. the promotion of general, institutionalised forms of participation at the local level, became 
the new vision of development planning, where participation could be seen as being both the 
means and the end of the process (cf. Blackburn/Holland 1998; Rauch 2002:512; Williams 
2004).  
 
According to the concept of structured participation, a sustainable institutionalised  and 
active involvement presupposes  a minimum level of organization on the part of local 
communities or stakeholders, as well as specific forms of decision-sharing, depending on the 
context and stage of the planning process. Universal recommendations for a one-size-fits-all 
‘tool kit’ for participation in development projects are therefore not feasible. Even so, certain 
minimal requirements of participation have been delimited: Firstly, information of all 
stakeholders well in advance of the decision-making process on actions and programs; 
secondly, a minimum delay in stakeholders' own decision-making- and articulation processes; 
and thirdly, an institutionalised right of co-determination in the relevant decision structures 
(cf. Rauch 2002:520-21). Participation requires a process, based on a bottom-up approach of 
delimitating targets and programs, as well as on mutual respect and reciprocal accountability. 
Partaking in project planning and implementation does not automatically lead to 
empowerment of the target groups, neither do measures to increase the accountability and 
                                                 
25
 cf. Kohnert/Preuss/Sauer 1992: 33-126; Kapoor 2002; Schönhuth 2002:12-16. - For further assessments of 
concepts of participatory development and its meaning for sustainable country strategies cf. Brinkerhoff 
 - 17 - 
transparency of counterparts. One of the major fallacies of NGOs’ development efforts is the 
illusion that, because of shared ideals and small size, such NGOs represent a homogenous 
group of beneficiaries, e.g. the poor and marginalized. Even within these groups, more often 
than not, strong, structural or ideological differences do exist. Promoting the concept of 
structured participation may reveal covert social and economic conflicts between the 
representatives of local NGOs and their beneficiaries, as well as within the stakeholder groups 
(notably gender specific differences). Nevertheless, common aims as well as conflicting 
interest have to be discussed and resolved; there is a need to elaborate choices and arbitrate 
between them, not necessarily with the ultimate aim of a consensus but rather of a sound 
compromise, in order that the development efforts may become sustainable and be owned by 
the beneficiaries (cf. Maxwell 2003:15-16). 
 
All these are particularly sensitive questions for INGOs, as most of them share the same 
convictions, ideals or ideologies with their partner organizations, who are meant to represent 
the beneficiaries. On one hand, this makes for stronger mutual trust between donors and 
partners as compared to state agencies; but on the other hand, INGOs often turn a blind eye to 
the question, whether their partners can really be considered as the legitimate voice of the 
target groups, and whether the aid has reached the latter as intended (cf. Carothers 2000:21; 
Encarnación 2002:125). The partnership ideology is especially virulent with INGOs of a 
religious orientation, and – for various reasons – this is one of the major causes for failures in 
reaching the target groups (cf. Kohnert et al 1992:57-64).The new request of INGOs for 
institutionalised participation could be interpreted by their partners as a sign of mistrust, or as 
indicative of the  intention to by-pass them, and thereby undermine the trust relationship 
between both. In addition, the commitment to partnership runs the risk of degrading into 
covert conditionality in view of the unequal partnership structures and asymmetric 
accountability (cf. Maxwell 2003:19; ids 2001; Pender 2001). Even more importantly, if the 
building up of real partnership takes time and resources, the institutionalisation of 
participation by stakeholders requires even more. This will be a major bottleneck in 
promoting capacity-building and structural participation through INGOs and local NGOs 
alike: Firstly, because they are usually under pressure to deliver prompt results in view of the 
limited size of their projects and the greater and more direct dependency on legitimacy vis à 
vis their sponsors, compared with state agencies. Secondly, sponsors and activists supporting 
NGOs are reluctant to spend their money on institutional changes because these have the onus 
                                                                                                                                                        
2002; Cornwall/Pratt 2003; gtz 1998; ids 2001; Kapoor 2002; Klingebiel 2003; Maxwell 2003; Parfitt 2004; 
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of ineffective bureaucratic measures. In the third place, INGOs are increasingly forced by 
globalisation to focus on emergency aid (cf. above), but the very nature of this business often 
does not allow for sufficient time for capacity building. All this underlines once more the 
need for INGOs to honour their overall aim to promote sustainable development (cf. Clay 
2004; Donner 2004). With respect to humanitarian aid, this involves the serious effort to 
transform short-term emergency aid into effective and lasting programs of reconstruction and 
crisis prevention. Without such an effort, INGOs may unwittingly contribute to 
recapitulations of emergencies and crisis. Since the history of failed participation concepts 
shows that words alone do not count, INGOs have to develop more robust structural means 
and management tools to ensure this transformation 
26
. Capacity-building for the structural 
participation by stakeholders is therefore a key (cross-sectoral) task to be enshrined in 
INGOs’ country concepts. 
 
 
4. The most radical change needed is by donors – From result-orientated 
planning to participative organizational cultures of learning 
 
One basic assumption of actor-centered participation approaches as formulated by Robert 
Chambers and others is ‘the primacy of the personal’, i.e. the power of personal choice, or the 
view that the most effective way to promote the empowerment of stakeholders under 
conditions of unequal power relations lies in voluntary personal transformation (cf. Kapoor 
2002:110-11; Chambers 1997:14, 231-34; ids 2001). Chambers recognized that individual 
power can be exerted (and misappropriated) in multiple domains, including politics and the 
economy, social and geographical spaces, professions, age, and sex, and last but not least 
within institutions. He maintains that the misuse of power can be minimized by dialogue and 
negotiated relationships. But the onus for such personal transformation clearly lies with the 
'uppers', i.e. powerful and dominant individuals, who are confronted with the weak and 
subordinate. Thus, some of the large INGOs and multilateral aid agencies were embracing the 
idea of becoming a learning organization (cf. Pettit et al 2003; Senge et al 1994). The 
powerful would have to be convinced and trained to step-down, to give up something, for the 
reward of the personal satisfaction of achieving ethical aims and more efficient and target-
orientated results in their work. These propositions of the actor-centered approach to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rauch 2002; OECD 1995a; 1997; Schönhuth 2002; Samoff/Stromquist 2001; WB 1996; Williams 2004. 
26
 The stipulation of DWHH to restrict humanitarian aid programs by administrative means to a maximum level 
of 80 per cent external funding (cf. chapter 2) seems to be a first, though minor step in the right direction. 
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participation have a pronounced voluntaristic and ethical, if not ideological bias. It is difficult 
to see how, for example, a training program for powerful development managers or aid 
workers in listening to and learning from the powerless could be successfully implemented at 
any level, without whichever supporting and generally accepted rules of compliance or 
enforcement (cf. Kapoor 2002: 111-14). In fact, what has been demanded from the ‘uppers’ 
would be similar to a ‘cultural revolution’ in the headquarters of aid agencies, merely guided 
by the right incentives. This is certainly a weak proposition, and, if at all, a second-best 
solution. Yet, the question remains, whether there are any realistic alternatives which do not 
interfere with the right of self-determination, which the international community, and notably 
the INGOs, concede to all partners and stakeholders.  
The quest for structured and institutionalised participation was meant to cure this deficit of 
the voluntaristic participation approach in the recipient countries. In following the logic of the 
actor-centered approach of the primacy of transformation of the powerful, it would be 
consistent to ask, whether any similar structures of participation could be installed in donor 
countries, thereby breaking the ‘cartel of good intentions’. That would be important, because 
‘despite the good intentions, altruism, and genuine professional dedication of the individuals 
involved’, this cartel is ‘suppressing critical feedback and learning from the past, suppressing 
competitive pressure to deliver results, and suppressing identification of the best channel of 
resources for different objectives’ (Easterly 2002:64). The normative approach of the 
‘learning organization’ with its commitment to valuing different kinds of knowledge, 
encouraging team work and dialogue and the exploration of differences in aims and 
experiences (cf. Roper/Pettit 2003:2-3) is laudable but probably not sufficient to effect this 
‘cultural revolution’ within INGOs. 
 
The obstacles to change in planning cultures of aid agencies are legion. They have been 
analysed in detail by others (cf. Biggs/Smith 2003; Chapman 2002; Easterly 2002; Berg 2000; 
ids 2001, Kohnert/Preuss/Sauer 1992; Lancaster 1999; Mosse 2004; Pettit et al 2003; Rossi 
2004; Schönhuth 2002), and it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them further. Here, 
it may suffice to underline that the rationalistic view of a results-based planning approach as 
panacea for the major ills of development planning is based on illusions. Up to the 1990s, 
target orientated development planning had been advocated by major aid organizations as 
prime instrument of strategic planning and management. In the meantime this concept has 
been questioned out of theoretical and operational reasons (cf. chapter 2). New results-
orientated rules and instruments of development planning, like country concepts, are still 
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needed in a modified form 
27
, but they will be effective only if accompanied by a radical 
change of attitudes on the part of those who apply them; this hold for all aid agency, 
governmental and non-governmental alike 
28
. The new consensus on strategic planning 
assumes that effective organizational learning counts as least as much as results (cf. Beckwith 
et al 2003:206; Senge et al 1994). Certainly, this personal transformation and the change of 
aid agencies organizational culture can neither be imposed nor engineered (cf. ids 2001). 
Therefore, immersion-, exposure-, or dialogue-programs, aimed at bringing agency staff in 
direct contact with the live and perspectives of the poor they want to assist, can be extremely 
helpful. This has been proved already by several immersion-programs of governmental- and 
non-governmental aid organizations, like the Grass Roots Immersion Program (GRIP) of the 
World Bank, or similar instruments of the German GTZ, the Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA), the British Department of International Development (DFID), 
or ActionAid (cf. IDS 2004; Irvine et al 2004; Jupp 2004) 
29
. But additional structural 
changes, including effective reward structures, providing for the genuine participation by 
stakeholders in the development process, and for the collegial equality of partner 
organizations, are required for any tangible advancement towards more effective development 
planning. 
 
It has therefore been acknowledged that the first, and most radical change is demanded 
from the donors (cf. Maxwell 2003; ids 2001; 2004; Kohnert/Preuss 2003, WB 2003: viii). 
INGOs should be at the forefront in effecting this adjustment, as they have to defend their 
reputation of a close and special relationship with their partners overseas, not just for moral 
reasons but for economic gain too (cf. chapter 1). Change may be effected by different 
groups, even simultaneously and in a coordinated way, if the incentives are right, but the 
greatest responsibility for the transformation lies with those in power, within aid agencies and 
between agencies and their partners. This has been recognized only recently by multilateral 
aid institutions like the Worldbank (WB 2003: viii), as well as by INGOs like Oxfam or 
                                                 
27
 For recommendations on adapted country concepts for INGOs as well as examples of best practices cf. 
Kohnert 2002. 
28
 Cf. the evaluation report of the PRSP by the World Bank Evaluation Unit: ‘implementation of the CDF 
principles requires difficult changes in the behaviors and practices of both donors and recipients.’ (WB 
2004:vii); and Mosse (2004:667): ‘most agencies are bound to a managerial view of policy which makes 
them resolutely simplistic about (or ignorant of) the social and political life of their ideas.’ 
29
 Cf. also the Exposure and Dialogue Program of the Association for the Promotion of North-South Dialogue, 
its aims, organisation and fields of application, as developed by the program ‘Development has got a face’, 
by the German Catholic INGO ‘Justice and Peace’, available at the website: http://www.exposure-
nsd.de/Publications.htm; 01.09.04 
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ActionAid 
30
, and by representatives of non-state actors, like the German Bishop Conference. 
The latter recently published a policy paper of the expert group ‘World economy and Social 
Ethics’31, demanding greater responsibility of the donors and reciprocity of conditionality. 
Last but not least, the group demanded that donors be held responsible for the cost of the 
repercussions of their failed development projects. Once again a just, but pious wish, given 
the absence of means for its implementation. 
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